India Ups the Ante Against China in Beijing’s Lake

The shock reversal by India of its beforehand impartial stance to increase its help to the 2016 Arbitral Award on the South China Sea nullifying the legitimacy of China’s so-called “nine-dash line” is a step by Delhi to lift its regional profile and delineate a extra vigorous function in opposition to Beijing.

China has ignored the July 12, 2016 choice by the arbitral tribunal within the Hague, which held overwhelmingly for the Philippines, figuring out that main components of China’s declare together with current land reclamation on islets and different actions in Philippine waters had been illegal beneath the United Nations Conference for the Legislation of the Sea (UNCLOS). 

India’s assertion of help for the Philippines, delivered to Enrique A. Manalo throughout a June go to by the Philippines’ overseas secretary, comes at a time when China and the Affiliation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are within the midst of intense negotiations over a mutually agreed code of conduct for the strategically essential sea hall that China claims as its unique area. With India altering its stance within the wake of its personal tensions with China in Ladakh, Beijing is more and more going through diplomatic isolation.

New Delhi has apparently began a sport of actual politics. For India, taking a regular place on this regional dispute means tapping into a significant geopolitical alignment that has its roots unfold so far as Washington, the place policymakers, for the previous a number of years, have been making an attempt to construct a worldwide coalition in opposition to China. In Washington’s Indo-Pacific technique, New Delhi does have a outstanding function to play. Now that New Delhi is beginning to reinforce Washington’s stance vis-à-vis China and its involvement in regional disputes, it may well solely be a really encouraging signal for the Biden administration in addition to that of the littoral nations of the South China Sea, significantly the Philippines and Vietnam, which have been essentially the most confrontational to China, albeit ineffectively within the face of China’s overwhelming navy benefit and aggressiveness.

India’s choice to reverse its earlier place comes in opposition to the backdrop of New Delhi’s personal lack of ability to reclaim the territory it misplaced to China within the Ladakh area just a few years in the past. As Indian intelligence reported to the Indian Congress in August-2020, China has about 1,000 sq. km in Ladakh beneath its management. With Delhi discovering itself unable to push China again, it finds itself in the identical place because the Southeast Asian nations. Supporting the latter’s stance in opposition to China, subsequently, is smart for India.

This diplomatic reversal can also be tied to India’s different forays into Southeast Asia. With an eye fixed on the ASEAN nations’ territorial battle with China, Delhi is actively in search of to promote its arms to them to higher equip themselves in opposition to a Chinese language confrontation. In March, the India-based protection agency BrahMos Aerospace mentioned it was in superior discussions with Indonesia on a US$200 million supersonic cruise missile deal. The Philippines can also be scheduled to obtain its first supply of those missiles from India.

In Might, India held its first maritime train with ASEAN within the South China Sea, main Chinese language maritime militias to strategy the world the place the train was being held. Though China denied its presence, Indian authorities confirmed that they had been monitoring at the very least 5 Chinese language vessels, symbolizing the approaching collectively of India and ASEAN in opposition to a coming rival. For a lot of, that is the approaching of age of India’s “Look East” coverage.

This coming of age is coinciding with a rising shift in India’s overseas coverage in direction of Washington, most lately evident within the current SCO summit, the place India’s Modi, in sharp distinction to the Chinese language and Russian leaders, not solely questioned the SCO’s feasibility but additionally downplayed its significance when he invited the group to “ collectively ponder upon” whether or not the SCO is “evolving into a corporation that’s absolutely ready for the longer term,” 

Modi and his administration are thus additionally warming to a corporation ready properly for the longer term: the North Atlantic Treaty Group (NATO) and its rising presence in Asia. In reality, Washington’s NATO Ambassador Julianne Smith lately mentioned that, whereas the group was not trying to have any members from Asia, it was very a lot open to extra engagement with nations like India.

“By way of the longer term with India, I believe NATO’s door is open by way of engagement ought to India have an interest,” she mentioned. “However we’d not wish to at this stage invite them to NATO ministerial till we knew extra about their curiosity in partaking the alliance extra broadly.”

This risk of engagement with India is inspired by the truth that 4 nations positioned exterior of the Euro-Atlantic area have already established ties with NATO and their officers had been current within the current assembly of NATO International Ministers in April. These are Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Japan. Of those 4, India is already allied with Australia and Japan alongside the US within the anti-China Quadrilateral Safety Group (QUAD), consequently binding India with a presence within the area with a visual choice for a Euro-Atlantic-led system of mixed safety.

The massive query, nevertheless, is whether or not India’s cautious entanglement with such a system would actually pay New Delhi off. In easy phrases, would the US come to India’s assist in the wake of an precise navy battle with China in Ladakh?

As critics have identified, in any potential battle between China and India, the battlefield could be Ladakh, not the US, which implies the US would haven’t any direct stake in such a battle. There’s not a touch of a protection treaty that will make the previous’s participation obligatory, neither is there prone to be anytime quickly. Even when India decides to have interaction with NATO, the latter is much from having a proper navy presence within the area, as many ASEAN nations stay very a lot open to extending and deepening commerce ties with China and making a system of advanced interdependence.

New Delhi’s choices are additional sophisticated by the truth that Washington is unlikely to supply a proper protection treaty in opposition to China with out extracting important concessions from India, particularly with regard to India’s ties with Moscow.

In different phrases, for India to essentially up the ante in opposition to China within the area, it wants Washington’s assist. However Washington’s assistance is unlikely to grow to be fully-fledged with out India making important adjustments in its overseas coverage. The Indian chief gave a touch of attainable change on the SCO summit. Whether or not or not this can take a everlasting flip stays to be seen. Nonetheless, if – and at any time when – India takes that flip, this may even mark the tip of its strategic autonomy inside at the moment’s multipolar world.

Salman Rafi Sheikh is an Assistant Professor of Politics on the Lahore College of Administration Sciences (LUMS). He holds a PhD in Politics and Worldwide Research from SOAS, College of London. He’s a longtime common contributor to Asia Sentinel