From polarisation to opportunism: organised Islam and the 2024 elections – New Mandala

In Indonesia’s 2019 presidential election, the stream of help from Islamic teams to the 2 presidential tickets was distinctly polarised. Conservatives rallied behind Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno, whereas Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)—the nation’s largest Islamic organisation, which claims to symbolize as much as 90 million Muslims—unequivocally endorsed Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Ma’ruf Amin. A development in partisan polarisation amongst Indonesian Islamic organisations had been evident because the 2014 presidential election, when many NU followers solidifyied their help for Jokowi. It solely grew stronger in 2019, when Maruf Amin, NU’s supreme chief (rais aam), was nominated as Joko Widodo’s working mate.

In distinction, the 2024 presidential election displays the other development. Islamic teams’ help for the present presidential candidates are primarily being pushed by political opportunism as an alternative of by stark ideological variations.

Our analysis substantiates observations of a de-polarisation in 2024 by evaluation of an unique database recording the spiritual affiliations of every candidate’s nationwide marketing campaign workforce (tim sukses/“success workforce”) members. In distinction to the 2019 presidential election, the composition of non secular figures represented in every tim sukses throughout this 12 months’s presidential election displays how ideological divisions—whereas they nonetheless exist—have weakened significantly.

Islamic help by the numbers

Primarily based on quite a few media stories detailing the officially-announced lineup of tim sukses, we’re capable of map out how totally different Islamic organisations and their leaders are dividing their loyalties between the 2024 candidates. The Anies Baswedan—Muhaimin Iskandar (branded as AMIN) coalition boasts 49 affiliated Islamic figures, constituting 29% of their whole tim sukses members. The Prabowo Subianto–Gibran Rakabuming Raka coalition has 69 Islamic figures, accounting for 27% of their whole, whereas the Ganjar Pranowo–Mahfud MD coalition trails with the bottom proportion at 20%, comprising solely 8 Islamic figures.

Absolutely the variety of Islamic figures on the Ganjar–Mahfud workforce is way decrease than the opposite tickets, as a result of Ganjar’s presidential candidacy is primarily backed by the Indonesian Democratic Occasion of Battle (PDI–P), which additionally dominates the composition of Ganjar-Mahfud tim sukses. Whereas Ganjar can also be supported by one Islamic social gathering, the United Improvement Occasion (PPP), there are solely a handful of PPP figures among the many ranks of his tim sukses, seemingly as a result of it’s a small social gathering which solely barely meets the Indonesia’s 4% parliamentary threshold. As Ganjar’s main political supporter, PDI-P has saved a good grip on his presidential marketing campaign and has ensured {that a} majority of his tim sukses come from its personal ranks.

Against this, each AMIN and Prabowo–Gibran coalitions have extra Islamic-oriented supporting events to fill out their tim sukses. AMIN is supported by the Nationwide Awakening Occasion (PKB), which is affiliated with NU, and the Affluent Justice Occasion (PKS) which is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood-influenced Tarbiyah motion. AMIN’s vice-presidential candidate, PKB Chairman Muhaimin Iskandar, is the great-grandson of the founding father of NU Bisri Syansuri, including to his charismatic enchantment amongst NU figures.

Prabowo and Gibran’s Islamic social gathering help comes from the Nationwide Mandate Occasion (PAN)—which is loosely linked with Muhammadiyah—and the Indonesian Individuals’s Wave Occasion (Partai Gelora), a brand new social gathering established by a number of former PKS leaders.

Spiritual figures affiliated with NU dominate the listing of tim sukses members of Anies and Prabowo. Inside AMIN’s coalition, 24 out of 49 members are affiliated with NU, the Prabowo–Gibran coalition claims 18 out of 69 and the Ganjar–Mahfud coalition has 4 out of 8. In stark distinction, the illustration of Muhammadiyah, the second largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia, has comparatively meagre illustration. Solely two members of the AMIN and Ganjar–Mahfud campaigns groups are affiliated with Muhammadiyah.

The illustration of Islamic figures affiliated by the Tarbiyah motion, the forebear of the Islamist Affluent Justice Occasion (PKS), is noteworthy. They comprise 16 members of AMIN’s tim sukses, surpassing these from Muhammadiyah.

From the composition of every respective tim sukses, we are able to see how traditionalist Islamic teams, (represented by NU) merge with modernist (represented by Muhammadiyah) and conservative Islamist teams (represented by Tarbiyah/PKS). Each AMIN and Prabowo–Gibran coalitions have tim sukses that unite NU and Tarbiyah figures.

Our evaluation additionally reveals that the inclusion of non secular figures within the tim sukses just isn’t solely influenced by the help of coalition events, but in addition by the personalistic relationships solid between candidates and these spiritual figures. This dynamic is obvious within the numerous help garnered from NU-affiliated figures for varied presidential candidates. The AMIN workforce, for example, has efficiently secured endorsement from quite a few NU kyai in Central and East Java provinces on account of the longstanding relationships between these kyai and PKB and—extra particularly—Muhaimin.

Many kyai who’re backing AMIN are homeowners of enormous Islamic boarding colleges (pesantren induk) which normally have a big community of scholars (santri) in dozens of smaller pesantren. It’s this in depth kyai–santri community that’s being sought by the tim sukses of every candidates, since every of them encompass tens of hundreds potential voters who may determine a candidate’s political fortunes inside a given pesantren’s locality.

The AMIN workforce’s mobilisation amongst NU ranks appears to be paying off. In line with the newest survey launched by Indikator Politik Indonesia on 18 January, Anies’ help in East Java elevated by 9.3 p.c from 1 December 2023 to six January 2024. Nonetheless, Prabowo nonetheless has a commanding lead within the province with 48.2% help, Ganjar 24.5%, and Anies 21.7%.

Within the Prabowo–Gibran coalition, NU kyai supporting the pair are those that have beforehand endorsed and established relationships with both Prabowo or Jokowi in earlier elections. A pivotal endorsement for Prabowo–Gibran comes from Habib Luthfi bin Yahya, the supreme chief of the Jam’iyyah Ahli Thariqah al-Mu’tabarah al-Nahdliyah, the principle affiliation of Sufi Order (tariqa) to which most NU clerics are affiliated. Notably, Habib Luthfi additionally holds a place as a member of President Jokowi’s Council of Presidential Advisors.

The eclipse of Muhammadiyah by NU

The pragmatic and opportunistic nature of non secular figures inclusion in every candidate’s tim sukses have created pressures inside each NU and Muhammadiyah to permit their respective clerics and activists to again one of many presidential candidates, whereas additionally retaining their standing as politically impartial spiritual organisations. Lengthy divided into a number of factions based mostly on private allegiances to influential kyai, NU’s help throughout this 12 months’s election is equally divided among the many three presidential candidates. Whereas NU’s nationwide management (Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama, or PBNU) has formally taken a impartial place, most outstanding NU clerics and activists have pledged their endorsement towards one of many candidates.

In the meantime, Muhammadiyah activists are torn between its management’s official place to retain neutrality and their very own needs to publicly help presidential candidates. A lot of them see the 2024 election as essential for the way forward for the 111-year-old Islamic organisation, as it’s seen to be shedding political affect vis-à-vis different organisations like NU.

Muhammadiyah has previously loved important patronage from post-reformasi Indonesian presidents, notably beneath Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), throughout whose first time period Muhammadiyah figures held 5 cupboard portfolios. As we speak, nonetheless, Muhammadiyah’s illustration within the authorities is decreased to only one minister in Jokowi’s second-term cupboard—the Coordinating Minister of Human Improvement and Cultural Affairs, broadly thought of an unimportant and never particularly profitable place.

That is in distinction to NU, which is represented not solely by Vice President Ma’ruf Amin but in addition a further 4 ministers, together with the Minister of Spiritual Affairs. Along with the cupboard, NU affiliated figures additionally dominate in appointments of top-echelon civil service positions, particularly on the Spiritual Affairs Ministry, which has the authority to control all issues associated to Muslim affairs, together with spiritual pilgrimage and  pesantren schooling. With an annual price range of 63 trillion Rupiah (US$4 billion), it has the fourth largest price range of all Indonesian ministries, making it very profitable for NU.

Muhammadiyah activists are spooked by the speedy decline within the organisation’s social base. In a September 2023 article, pollster Denny JA discovered that solely 5.7% of his August 2023 survey respondents self-declared themselves as Muhammadiyah followers, whereas in 2005, greater than 9.4% of respondents did so—a decline of 40% over an 18-year interval. Different analysts have attributed this decline to a rising variety of Muhammadiyah cadres (notably the younger) becoming a member of extra religiously conservative Islamist teams like Tarbiyah/PKS, Hizb-ut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), and varied Salafi-leaning teams.

As a result of these components, there’s a rising notion inside its ranks that Muhammadiyah is shedding out to NU within the competitors for political favour and patronage in the course of the Jokowi years. Thus the organisation, regardless of its formally impartial place, appears desperate to domesticate relations with all three 2024 presidential candidates.

This may be seen clearly in its determination to host a sequence of presidential candidate fora at Muhammadiyah College campuses in Solo, Malang, and Surabaya between 21 and 24 November 2023.  Throughout these boards,  Muhammadiyah leaders requested the candidates whether or not they plan to award cupboard positions to Muhammadiyah cadres. Each Anies Baswedan and Prabowo Subianto have indicated they may accomplish that, with Prabowo giving hints that at the very least two ministries—schooling and well being—is perhaps allotted to Muhammadiyah cadres.

Conclusion

To conclude, the non-ideological political manoeuvres of Indonesian Islamic organisations and events in backing the three presidential candidates within the 2024 election, regardless of previous ideological variations between them, additional proves the assertion that Indonesian politics continues to maneuver away from ideological competitors. As a substitute, Islamic teams and events, together with their nationalist counterparts, are putting extra emphasis on political opportunism as the first drivers of forming these presidential help coalitions.

Because of this considerations over the politicisation of Islam, and identification politics, which dominated the 2019 presidential election, have largely dissipated in the course of the 2024 contest. Islamic events and organisations are extra involved with gaining political appointments and patronage alternatives from whomever is elected as the brand new Indonesian president. This appears extra pressing amongst teams that seem to have misplaced political affect like Muhammadiyah. It has been incentivised to regain affect by extra in depth engagement with presidential candidates in order to not lose out to teams with extra illustration on the centre of energy, like NU. Whether or not this engagement will likely be profitable or not stays to be seen.